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The military’s increasing 
incursion into relief and 
development work has 
reshaped the notion of 
humanitarian space, the 
phrase coined by Rony 
Brauman of Médecins Sans 
Frontières to signify “that 
space of freedom in which we 
are free to evaluate needs, 
free to monitor the distribution 
and use of relief goods, 
and free to have a dialogue 
with people.”1 Humanitarian 
space is both a reality and an 
idea, embracing the physical 
geography stabilization 
and reconstruction (S&R) 
actors work in, as well as 
the concept of a safe place 
where confl ict and disaster 
victims can receive aid in 
a manner devoid of any 
political agenda.2
Nonpolitical actors, including 
many nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) and 
a few intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) and 
government civilian agencies, 
have traditionally served 
as the primary providers of 
vital relief, development, and 
infrastructure services, offering 
expertise and resources 
impartially to all who need 
them. As military forces 
have moved into insecure 
environments as various 
as Darfur, the Balkans, and 
Afghanistan, issues have 
arisen that fi eld staff have 
been forced to deconfl ict on 
the ground. Chief among 
them: Which services should 
the military be involved with 
and which services should be 
the sole province of civilian 
organizations? How can S&R 
actors cooperate to reduce 
overlapping services, improve 
their effectiveness, and 
preserve the security of all 
organizations? When should 
actors share information, what 
should they share, and how 
can they do so in a manner 
that protects humanitarian 
principles? How should 
security be optimized? And 
what are the proper protocols 
for preserving the distinction 
between military and civilian 
actors and underscoring the 
differences between their 
motives and missions? Military 
personnel often struggle to 
understand the importance 
of humanitarian principles 
— “principles, schminciples” 
as one military participant in a 
high-level civil-military dialogue 
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InterAction
Linda Poteat discussed 
the process of developing 
the Guidelines for Relations 
Between U.S. Armed Forces 
and Non-Governmental 
Humanitarian Organizations in 
Hostile or Potentially Hostile 
Environments. Beginning in 
2005, senior NGO, military, and 
government civilian agency 
leaders met over the course of 
two and a half years to discuss 
and develop a basic framework 
for interacting in the fi eld. The 
impetus for this initiative? The 
need to deconfl ict issues that 
were arising with the military’s 
increasing incursion into relief 
and development work, such 
as military forces performing 
relief activities in civilian clothes 
or instantly classifying security 
information and thus rendering 
it inaccessible to civilians. 
The United States Institute of 
Peace facilitated the dialogue 
and negotiation, which was 
contentious at times, as both 
sides shared their missions 
and priorities. The document 
provides guidance on how 
military and NGO personnel 
should behave, interact, and 
share information in the fi eld, as 
well as how organizations can 
serve as bridges between the 
two communities. 
While some NGOs and military 
representatives perpetuate 
polarizing stereotypes of each 
other, many NGOs are willing to 
cooperate with military forces on 
issues that make sense, such as 
sharing security information. “No 
single organization can speak 
for the entire NGO community. 
There is no uniformity in our 
approach or our perspectives. 
You have NGOs that don’t 
want to interact with the military 
and those that take funding 
from the Defense Department. 
Most of us fall in between,” 
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Introduction
  As military forces have moved into services traditionally 
administered by humanitarian actors, ﬁ eld staff have 
been forced to deconﬂ ict issues on the ground.  
                                          
Defi ning Civil-Military Cooperation
Four panelists representing the US military, NGO, IGO, and government 
civilian agency communities presented their perspectives. 
Matthew Vaccaro, Center for 
Stabilization and Reconstruction 
Studies (CSRS), shares insights 
with S/CRS’s Larry Sampler. 
(Continued on page 6)
ABOUT THIS EVENT 
The Center for Stabilization 
and Reconstruction Studies 
hosted an interactive 
skills building workshop, 
Working in the Same Space, 
September 21-24, 2008, in 
Seaside, California. The 
workshop convened 36 
S&R actors to discuss their 
organizational perspectives 
and differences, explore 
the issues of shared 
humanitarian space, 
enhance their negotiation 
and mediation skills, and 





government civilian agencies, 
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2   The UN’s Perspective
4   Negotiation and 
Mediation 
5   A New Approach
6   Dialogue as a 
Political Stabilization 
Strategy
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“ No single organization 
can speak for the entire 
NGO community. There 
is no uniformity in our 
approach or perspectives.”  
    —  Linda Poteat, 
InterAction 
1, 2  Wagner, Johanna Grombach. January 2006. “An IHL/ICRC Perspective on ‘Humanitarian Space.’” Humanitarian Exchange Magazine. Issue 32. Available at http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2765.
      Speaker:
Michael Marx
OCHA 
S&R organizations conducting 
humanitarian operations 
are working in a complex 
environment characterized 
by a proliferation of actors, 
a competitive funding 
environment, and increased 
public scrutiny, said Michael 
Marx. In addition the United 
Nations’ (UN) role is changing 
from an implementer to an 
overseer, as it sets standards 
and facilitates cooperation.
The UN’s authority was directly 
challenged when the US 
decided to invade Iraq in 2003 
without receiving a Security 
Council resolution. As a 
consequence, the cooperation 
and coordination between the 
UN and US military has been 
diffi cult, to such a degree that 
UN humanitarian agencies 
initially refused to interact with 
US forces and the USAID/
OFDA Disaster Assistance 
Response Teams (DART) 
operating in Iraq. 
Marx acknowledged 
that there is increasing 
humanitarian acceptance of 
an appropriate military role in 
relief operations, particularly 
in disaster response. 
However, efforts need to 
be coordinated to ensure 
that NGOs’ humanitarian 
principles are protected 
and that organizations are 
not executing competing 
or redundant work. OCHA 
provides guidelines to help 
relief actors understand their 
roles and leverage military 
resources, when appropriate.
So where does the UN see a 
role for military involvement 
in humanitarian response? 
The military can play a vital, 
behind-the-scenes role in 
providing indirect assistance 
or infrastructure support, 
both of which benefi t affected 
populations. However, the 
military should leave direct 
assistance, the face-to-face 
distribution of goods 
and services, to civilian 
aid organizations. 
The UN uses a wide array of 
coordination and response 
tools to meet the needs of 
the world’s 25 million confl ict 
victims, as well as the 
survivors of natural disasters. 
The UN’s cluster framework 
was designed to improve the 
predictability and accountability 
of humanitarian response by 
assigning accountability for 
critical activities — such as 
nutrition, water and sanitation, 
protection, and logistics — to 
a single agency or agency 
team. It was fi rst implemented 
to coordinate the response 
to the Pakistan earthquake 
of 2005. Each cluster lead is 
responsible for coordinating 
the work of multiple 
contributing organizations. The 
framework is implemented for 
major new emergencies and 
ongoing emergencies when a 
humanitarian coordinator has 
been appointed and the crisis 
requires response from a wide 
range of actors. In addition, 
leads must work to implement 
standards, build capacity, and 
improve operational support 
across their service area. 
The UN also offers different 
funding tools to help meet 
time-critical disaster response 
needs, including Flash 
Appeals, emergency cash 
grants, and the Central 
Emergency Response Fund, a 
standby fund that can quickly 
disperse monies for new or 
underfunded crises. Through 
the Consolidated Appeals 
Process, NGOs band together 
to raise funds for specifi c 
programs in a country or 
region and plan and execute 
cooperative initiatives.••
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The UN’s Perspective on Civil-Military Coordination 
OCHA’s Michael Marx described 
the UN’s work to improve 
and integrate S&R actors’ 
humanitarian response efforts.
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Working in the Same Space
   UN Coordination and Response Tools 
for Crises and Natural Disasters  
•  The cluster framework — A new approach that assigns 
a lead organization to critical activities to coordinate 
work and ensure adequate capacity. 
•  The Central Register of Disaster Management 
Capacities — An online resource of member states’ 
disaster response resources. As this database is 
diffi cult to maintain, OCHA often assists in expediting 
requests from countries in need.
•  UN Disaster and Coordination Teams — A network of 
emergency managers that can be mobilized to go 
to a disaster site, conduct assessments, and set up 
coordination structures within 24 hours.
•  Highly trained personnel — Search and rescue teams 
and environmental experts, among others.
•  Standby partners — Employees of commercial 
companies who can be deployed within 72 hours to set 
up cell phone access in disaster spots.
•  Relief supplies — Stockpiled for rapid global 
distribution.
•  Information tools — ReliefWeb, the global online 
resource for humanitarian information on complex 
emergencies and natural disasters. ReliefWeb’s 
resources include country updates, an aids fl ows 
database, map center, and a humanitarian directory. 
The site is available online at www.reliefweb.int. 
Learning Objectives
The event was designed to help S&R practitioners achieve 
the following learning objectives:
  Enhance their understanding of other S&R communities while expanding their 
professional networks
  Expand their repertoire of communication, negotiation, and mediation skills to 
strengthen interaction with other S&R actors
  Develop their capacity to build trust, identify shared objectives, 
and promote collaboration
  Explore emerging concepts and initiatives from the various S&R communities 
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said Poteat. What’s critical is 
that these interactions protect 
NGOs’ humanitarian principles, 
so that NGOs aren’t associated 
with the military. Several NGO 
representatives stated that 
many host governments were 
suspicious of NGO activities and 
looked for reasons to sabotage 
their work. “When you are on the 
ground, your job is to maintain the 
respect of the local population,” 
said an NGO representative. 
“People are often scared and 
angry, and our job is to help 
them become empowered.” 
Added another, “When an NGO 
arrives in a country like Sudan 
or Chad, everyone assumes that 
you work for the CIA. So you 
start from a defi cit. Calling an 
NGO a force multiplier can add 
to that defi cit. It could make the 
host government revoke your 
certifi cation and set back your 
programs by six months.” One 
NGO worker cited the Colombian 
government’s unauthorized use of 
the Red Cross logo on helicopters 
involved in rescuing Ingrid 
Betancourt as the most fl agrant 
recent violation. Said another: 
“From an NGO’s perspective, 
the rescue was an absolute 
disaster. What is the FARC going 
to think now when they interact 
with us in the fi eld? That act has 
fundamentally altered our work 
in Colombia.”
“You have to remember that 
NGOs are constantly under 
scrutiny,” advised an NGO 
representative. “If one of us 
jeopardizes his integrity, he 
may go away forever. You may 
be put in a hole in the ground. I 
know someone like that. These 
things happen every day. 
We are working in countries 
that don’t have transparent 
governments in power. We are 
working in situations where 
people will do anything to 
maintain their power.” As a 
consequence, NGOs will often 
exert pressure if one of their 
counterparts steps out of line. 
An NGO representative cited 
an example where NGOs 
reported the actions of a peer 
they felt was compromising the 
security and integrity of their 
operations to the donors they 
shared in common. Only the 
threat of funding loss reined in 
the rogue organization.
The idea of working in the 
same space, yet maintaining 
separateness, is a diffi cult 
issue for the military. Said 
one offi cer, “If you [NGOs] 
are receiving taxpayer dollars 
or security from my unit; you 
had better be aware of that. 
We put our lives at risk on 
your behalf, so you should 
cooperate and help us out a 
little bit.” A civil affairs offi cer 
posed the question at the 
heart of the civil-military 
cooperation debate: “Is it a 
pipe dream on our part to 
think that we’ll work together?”
No, said Poteat, highlighting 
different ways the military 
and NGO communities can 
strengthen cooperation in 
insecure environments. Chief 
among them:
•  Providing an NGO consultant 
to military planners to improve 
coordination in such confl ict 
zones as Afghanistan and Iraq.
•  Using NGO online resources 
such as ReliefWeb, rather 
than a Department of Defense 
(DoD) site. Poteat underscored 
NGO workers’ desire to access 





or store user 
information on a 
server. ReliefWeb 
has become the de 





•  Leveraging 
appropriate 
intermediaries, such 




among others, to 
facilitate dialogue 
and resolve issues.
•  Embedding the 
Guidelines in defense 
doctrine, such as the US 
Army’s new guide on 
stability operations, Field 
Manual 3-07.
•  Distributing the 
Guidelines
to all stakeholders, 
so that S&R practitioners 
at both the headquarters 
and fi eld levels are 
aware of new protocols.
•  Helping NGOs craft 
similar frameworks 
with other militaries.
To help military personnel 
at the workshop understand 
why opportunities for 
cooperation are necessarily 
limited, NGO and IGO 
representatives addressed 
some of the common 
misconceptions they face. 
These include the myth that 
NGOs are beholden to the 
US Government or serve 
as its agents, or that NGO 
workers segment service 
populations into “good guys” 
and “bad guys” and dispense 
or withhold services 
accordingly. “That’s a little 
simplistic,” acknowledged 
a military offi cer. “We 
recognize that there is a 
heavy neutral population.” 
Added another, “If we are not 
meeting local communities’ 
needs, someone else will. 
And that person could be a 
rebel commander.” ••




The Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. 
Armed Forces and Non-Governmental 
Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or 




Madoua Teko-Folly (left) and Nick Tomb (right) discuss Global Majority’s 
work with its executive director, Cameron Hunter (center). All three are 
involved with the Monterey-based NGO.
Susan McGregor of Humber College 
and York University networks with 
Phillip Rush of the Bonn International 
Center for Conversion. 
“ When an NGO arrives 
in a country like Sudan or 
Chad, everyone assumes 
that you work for the 
CIA. So you start from a 
deﬁ cit. Calling an NGO 
a force multiplier can add 
to that deﬁ cit.”  
    —  NGO 
Representative 
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Dr. Susan Hocevar and 
Cameron Hunter led training 
sessions to help participants 
develop better negotiation 
and mediation skills. The 
training culminated with 
two case studies where 
participants practiced new 
skills, fi rst in a two-person 
negotiation and later in a multi-
party negotiation involving 
stakeholders with competing, 
even polarizing, interests.
As they work in complex fi eld 
environments, S&R actors 
may be called on to facilitate 
dialogue with other practitioners 
or intervene between opposing 
parties. Developing a more 
sophisticated understanding 
of critical issues and a 
fuller palette of skills will 
help practitioners move 
beyond positions, or hard-
line negotiating stances, to 
interests. Interests underlie 
positions and represent 
what a party truly wants 
— and why. They may provide 
opportunities for developing a 
shared understanding of past 
grievances, identifying common 
areas for cooperation, and 
working towards the effective 
resolution of confl ict issues. 
As practitioners work with 
stakeholders representing a 
wide array of complex, and 
often shifting priorities, they 
should be aware that they are 
attempting to reconcile both the 
views of those sitting behind 
the table and other parties who 
are not present. These peace 
spoilers may seek to derail the 
implementation of any fi nal 
solution if their needs are not 
considered and addressed. 
Two common negotiation 
strategies are: distributive 
negotiation, where parties 
try to claim as large a share 
of available benefi ts as 
possible; and integrative 
negotiation, where parties 
seek to increase the total 
amount of benefi ts available 
to participants. In distributive 
negotiations, participants are 
often adversarial and seek 
to wrest concessions from 
their opponents. Parties will 
gain power by generating 
options and BATNAs (the best 
alternative to a negotiated 
agreement) and pointing out 
the fl aws of their opponents’ 
alternatives. Agreement is 
reached when parties can craft 
a proposal that they believe to 
be more acceptable than their 
other alternatives. 
With integrative negotiation, 
participants realize that they 
are pursuing different, but 
not necessarily incompatible, 
goals. As a consequence, 
they focus on identifying 
common or complementary 
goals, strengthening their 
relationship, and using creativity 
and effective communication 
to solve problems. Successful 
negotiators will focus on 
discovering compatible 
interests, striving to leverage 
a common understanding or 
goal for greater gains 
rather than aggressively 
negotiating positions. 
Negotiations can be both 
integrative and distributive, 
especially when there are 
multiple issues involved. Parties 
can “fractionalize” or examine 
issues in turn, discovering 
compatible interests and 
forming and assessing interests, 
or “bundle” them to deal with 
multiple issues at once. Issues 
that can’t be resolved should 
be set aside, to allow parties 
to build rapport and achieve 
success with other issues. By 
emphasizing interests rather 
than positions, opposing 
parties will focus attention on 
critical problems and needs, 
build awareness and trust, 
and develop and consider a 
wider range of solutions that 
benefi t both parties. The true 
test of a successful negotiation, 
of course, is whether it 
can be implemented. As a 
consequence, the negotiation 
team should involve all critical 
stakeholders in designing 
the solution, rather than 
handing off an unwieldy and 
unworkable settlement. 
Dr. Hocevar set up a negotiation 
scenario for the group: a two-
person negotiation between an 
NGO operations offi cer and a 
military offi cer. The situation: 
the need to negotiate the 
movement of supply convoys 
from a port city to a displaced 
persons camp through insecure 
territory. The point of the 
negotiation was to see if parties 
with competing priorities could 
create a solution that preserved 
humanitarian principles while 
acknowledging military resource 
constraints. In breakout groups, 
participants discussed a wide 
array of issues including 
security challenges, information 
sharing, and the role of local 
actors. Participants negotiated 
different solutions such as 
providing area security and 
checkpoints, fi nding alternative 
driving routes, leveraging local 
security forces, and creating go 
and no go criteria for convoy 
passage. NGO representatives 
set stringent criteria for sharing 
information, agreeing to provide 
security updates, but not 
sources, if meetings were held 
in a neutral location. 
Participants critiqued the 
scenario’s emphasis on armed 
escorts, which most NGOs do 
not use. Instead, they use a 
community acceptance strategy 
for security, believing that if 
communities value NGOs’ 
work, members will protect staff 
and assets. In addition, they 
discussed the misconception 
that civil affairs offi cers and 
NGO country directors are 
direct counterparts. While civil 
affairs personnel can provide 
a useful role in facilitating 
information sharing, they do not 
have decision making authority, 
which both country directors and 
military commanders possess. 
As a consequence, NGO 
representatives said they would 
prefer to negotiate directly with a 
commanding offi cer. 
Sometimes confl ict is too 
intractable to be solved by face-
to-face negotiations and parties 
will then agree to be facilitated 
by a neutral third party. Hunter 
provided a brief overview of 
mediation, where opposing 
parties voluntarily agree to 
work with an intermediary who 
seeks to explore options and 
help facilitate the creation of a 
binding agreement. 
Nick Tomb, CSRS Program 
Coordinator, then facilitated 
a more complex negotiation 
exercise, one where OCHA 
served as the mediator to a 
diverse group of stakeholders 
including the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, US 
Army Civil Affairs, the Afghan 
Ministry of the Interior, and 
three NGOs. The situation: a 
meeting to discuss perspectives 
on provincial reconstruction 
teams (PRTs). The three 
NGO roles were designed to 
represent a range of views of 
civil-military cooperation, from 
dogmatic independents to more 
cooperative organizations. 
Participants were assigned 
roles that were diametrically 
opposed to their professional 
roles. Thus, a military 
offi cer became a hard-line 
NGO leader, and an NGO 
representative, a civil
affairs offi cer. 
Participants discussed how 
parties’ intractable positions, 
competing organizational 
priorities, and the absence of 
critical stakeholders shaped 
their discussions. Their 
realizations helped broaden 
their understanding of others’ 
viewpoints. Said a military 
offi cer: “We all kept assuming 
that we shared the same 
goals, but that wasn’t true.” 
Added another: “I realized 
it must be quite humiliating 
for a government offi cial to 
sit in a meeting like this and 
accept aid.” Meanwhile, an 
NGO representative playing 
the military role said, “It was 
refreshing to play a role that 
had such clear-cut goals. As an 
NGO staffer, I never have had 
that clarity. I always wanted a 
little bit of multiple things.”
One reason participants may 
have had diffi culty negotiating 
ideological divides was the lack 
of urgency about the issues on 
the table. Humanitarian crises 
have a way of crystallizing 
issues and forcing cooperation, 
said an IGO member. S&R 
actors understand the need 
to cooperate to mobilize 
resources, target efforts to 
populations in need, and ensure 
the safety of their personnel. 
This same impetus is not 
present in development or non-
hostile environments. 
Participants also discussed the 
nuances of facilitation versus 
mediation. Organizations 
such as OCHA and S/CRS 
Participants had a chance to strengthen negotiation skills in two different 
scenarios featuring an array of S&R actors and organizational perspectives. 
Working in the Same Space
Using Negotiation and Mediation Skills Effectively
CSRS holds eight events in Monterey, CA, each year to provide S&R 
actors with an opportunity to share insights and begin crafting new 
solutions to the challenges they face rebuilding failed states. 
US forces are playing a larger role in relief and reconstruction efforts 
globally, as part of the military’s campaign to win “hearts and minds.”
When multiple issues are involved, parties can choose 
to “fractionalize,” or focus on one issue at a time, 
or “bundle” issues, to drive to a faster resolution.
(Continued on page 5)
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    Speaker:
Carl Siebentritt
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Carl Siebentritt spoke about 
the US Government’s work 
to strengthen interagency 
cooperation. Established by 
Presidential Directive 44, 
S/CRS suffered years 
of political limbo and 
underfunding. With the 2008 
budget, S/CRS fi nally began 
receiving the necessary 
funding to achieve its 
mission of coordinating 
and leading interagency 
efforts; harmonizing US 
Government efforts with US 
military operations at the 
planning and implementation 
phases; and creating a 
strong civilian response 
capacity. To develop a unifi ed 
operating system, S/CRS 
has developed a three-tiered 
Interagency Management 
System (IMS) consisting of 
a Washington, DC-based 
interagency decision making 
body supported by a planning, 
operations, and resource 
mobilization secretariat; 
interagency planners and 
experts who deploy to 
military headquarters to help 
unify civil-military response; 
and teams of specialized 
personnel who deploy to the 
capitals and provinces of 
failing states to help integrate 
US Government activities. 
“With the Active Response 
Corps, we’re turning the PRT 
model on its head,” said 
Siebentritt. “We’re not trying 
to create a substitute for 
DART teams. We’re focusing 
on the next phase: two to 
three years beyond the 
immediate crisis.”
S/CRS has eight interagency 
partners and received 
$75 million in the 2008 
supplemental US Government 
budget to fund a 100-person 
Active Response Corps. With 
its $249 million budget request 
for fi scal year 2009, S/CRS 
hopes to hire 250 personnel 
for its active component who 
would be deployable within two 
to fi ve days; identify a standby 
reserve of 2000 personnel 
who would be deployable on 
30 to 45 days of notice; and 
recruit a 2000-person reserve 
who could deploy within 45 to 
90 days. All corps members 
would temporarily fulfi ll vital 
professional roles, such as 
planning, operations, and 
management; rule of law; 
economic recovery; essential 
services; governance; and 
the like. Personnel are only 
mobilized when the IMS 
determines that a complex 
emergency requires a whole of 
government approach. ••
A New Approach to Preventing 
and Responding to Confl ict
S/CRS was created to integrate the US Government’s 
response to global crises and to create civilian capacity to 
help failed states rebuild key infrastructures and services.
S/CRS’s Carl Siebentritt spoke 
about the US Government’s 
innovative efforts to build civilian 
agency S&R capacity.
CSRS regularly hosts education workshops for S&R practitioners to 
deepen their knowledge, broaden their practical skills, and enhance their 
professional networks. To design highly relevant, cutting-edge curricula, 
we vet new ideas with the communities we serve and then collaborate 
with other organizations and subject matter experts to design the right 
content mix. An overview follows:
typically serve as coordinators, 
bringing key parties to the table, 
but shy away from any activities 
that could be construed as 
promoting a particular 
agenda. One risk these 
organizations run: creating a 
cult of personality. “There are 
certain people who are well-
known in our fi eld. Because 
they are so well-respected, 
they are effective conveners,” 
said an IGO member. “People 
will come to meetings because 
they know that they will get 
something out of it. But the 
problem you create is the 
perception of having an A team 
and a B team. If you send the B 
team out, the people start off at 
a disadvantage and the work is 
a lot slower.”
Participants debated the 
applicability of mediation 
principles to all cultures. One 
described how nomadic tribes 
negotiate land rights in Sudan, 
and how host government 
intervention harmed preexisting 
agreements. “There are often 
natural, indigenous ways 
of resolving confl ict,” said 
the NGO participant, “and it 
may be better to leave those 
systems in place than impose 
our standards. Or else we may 
need to use a lighter touch.” 
In addition, S&R practitioners 
may operate in environments 
so degraded that the natural 
rule of law has broken down 
and they must rebuild legal 
systems. In this type of 
situation, “you have to be 
careful that you aren’t used to 
game or disrupt the existing 
structure,” said an NGO 
representative. NGOs typically 
leverage their local staff to 
navigate complex milieus, 
gathering information about 
critical issues, stakeholders, 
and socially accepted confl ict 
resolution strategies. However, 
two other participants also said 
that sometimes it’s important 
to use cultural differences to 
force change. “Negotiation is 
dependent on context,” said 
an NGO member, “but there 
are times when being an ugly 
American can work to your 
advantage. You can use your 
cultural approach to get to the 
critical issues.” However, such 
an approach should be used 
delicately, as NGOs remain 
in countries for years and 
necessarily should preserve 
important working relationships 
with local actors. ••
Using Negotiation continued from page 4
 There are often natural, 
indigenous ways of 
resolving conﬂ ict, and 
it may be better to 
leave those systems 
in place than impose 
Western standards.
CSRS Programs for S&R Actors
Our Themes
•  Health and humanitarian affairs
•  Institution building and 
security sector reform
•  S&R skills and tools
•  Economic recovery
•  Maritime and naval issues 
Our Format
•  Several events a year in 
Monterey, CA
•  Emphasis on cognitive 
learning and skills development
•  3-5 days in length
Workshops feature:
•  Peer presentations
•  Guest lectures
•  Case studies
•  Exercises and simulations
•  Networking 
Participants include 40-45 S&R 
practitioners who represent: 
•  Nongovernmental organizations
•  Intergovernmental 
organizations
•  US and international 
government civilian agencies
•  US and international 
armed forces
put it. Yet overstepping 
organizational neutrality can 
compromise the integrity of 
NGOs’ work. The cost can 
be great, as organizations 
may lose access to service 
populations and employees’ 
lives could be put in harm’s 
way. Numerous workshop 
participants talked about the 
escalation of attacks on NGO 
staff and how confusion over 
local actors’ roles can result in 
swift reprisals against offending 
organizations. To illuminate and 
clarify this idea of humanitarian 
operating space, the OCHA 
Glossary of Humanitarian 
Terms states that:
Adherence to the key 
operating principles of 
neutrality and impartiality 
in humanitarian operations 
represents the critical means, 
by which the prime objective of 
ensuring that suffering must be 
met wherever it is found, can 
be achieved. Consequently, 
maintaining a clear distinction 
between the role and function 
of humanitarian actors from 
that of the military is the 
determining factor in creating 
an operating environment 
in which humanitarian 
organisations can discharge 
their responsibilities both 
effectively and safely.3
CSRS hosted Working in the 
Same Space to empower S&R 
practitioners with the insights 
and skills they need to facilitate 
the complex negotiations that 
arise in their work, both within 
the S&R community, and with 
local actors, including host 
governments, indigenous 
populations, rebel forces, 
and other stakeholders.
Actors work side-by-side in 
insecure environments, where 
fl uid security conditions often 
necessitate some  degree 
of cooperation. 
Working in the Same Space is 
just one of the workshops CSRS 
holds on a regular basis to 
provide a forum for global actors 
to engage with one another, 
discuss S&R challenges, and 
begin creating new solutions 
to complex problems. CSRS 
provides cross-community 
education across fi ve themes: 
health and humanitarian 
affairs, institution building and 
security sector reform, S&R 
skills and tools, economic 
recovery, and maritime and 
naval issues. “CSRS workshops 
mix our processes with your 
perspectives to create an 
environment where you can 
acquire new insights and skills 
and apply them to your work,” 
said Matthew Vaccaro, CSRS 
Program Director. 
Vaccaro began the workshop 
by giving an overview of 
the Center’s programs and 
then asking participants to 
introduce themselves, their 
organizations, and their 
work, while offering up some 
stereotypes about their 
communities. As S&R actors 
work together in the fi eld, they 
often encounter individuals 
whose organizational 
perspectives and working 
styles confl ict or compete with 
their own. As a consequence, 
it can be tempting to 
generalize cross-cultural 
others, short-circuiting the 
development of cooperative 
working relationships. What’s 
critical is to use new insights 
to update one’s perceptions 
on an ongoing basis. (See 
Tools for Cross-Cultural 
Understanding for more 
information on how deepening 
cultural fl uency can help 
S&R practitioners address 
the needs and motivations 
of diverse stakeholders in 
confl ict and crisis situations.)
Four panelists, representing 
the major communities who 
participate in S&R work, 
shared their organizational 
priorities and perspectives on 
working side-by-side in post-
confl ict environments. 
The Armed Forces
LtCol Bob Baird offered his 
personal perspective on the 
armed forces. Although the 
men and women of the armed 
forces wear similar uniforms, 
they represent very different 
cultures. An organization as 
vast as the US Army has 
multiple subcultures such 
as light infantry or armored 
combat units, each of which 
possesses its own operational 
focus and expertise. The US 
Marines, on the other hand, is 
a smaller fi ghting force with a 
more consistent organizational 
structure and culture. 
Military unit leaders acquire 
enormous responsibility early in 
their careers. A young captain, 
fi ve or six years out of college, 
may have responsibility for 120 
soldiers, overseeing everything 
from career development, to 
deployments, to discipline. As 
a lieutenant colonel, that same 
offi cer would have responsibility 
for 1000-1500 soldiers. “We 
give our commanders authority 
over life and death, over when 
to shoot and when not to,” said 
LtCol Baird.
The military is in the process 
of a vast cultural change, 
due to its move into relief and 
infrastructure development 
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Working in the Same Space
 “ Some stereotypes are partially true. I am a tree 
hugger, but I don’t wear Birkenstocks. Why? You 
can’t run in them.”  — NGO Representative
S&R actors share perspectives gained from working in insecure 
environments around the world. 
Introduction continued from page 1
Community Dialogue as a Political Stabilization Strategy 
     Speaker:
Reverend Byron Bland
Associate Director
Stanford Center on International 
Confl ict and Negotiation
So how do negotiation 
strategies work in countries 
riven by decades of intractable 
confl ict? Reverend Bland 
presented his perspective 
on peacebuilding, developed 
during years of hands-on 
work with opposing parties in 
countries such as Northern 
Ireland or Israel and Palestine.
While negotiation tomes 
such as Getting to Yes present 
simple strategies for resolving 
confl ict, sometimes they simply 
don’t work, said Bland. Win-win 
outcomes are only possible if 
parties can leverage common 
interests to claim value from 
the other. Bland’s work has 
focused on helping opposing 
sides in corrupt, ineffi cient 
societies engage in constructive 
dialogue, build relationships, 
and broker political deals. 
What’s critically important 
is that groups grapple 
successfully with four 
consecutive questions:
•  The question of a shared 
future – Can each side 
envision a future for the 
other that is bearable? 
And can they align internal 
stakeholders around that 
vision? To address this 
question, opposing parties 
must establish a political 
domain and begin 
building trust.
•  The question of 
trustworthiness – Can the 
parties trust each other to 
honor commitments? And 
can each side manage 
peace spoilers whose 
interests aren’t served by 
reaching an agreement and 
might try to wreck it? Both 
parties should commit to 
reciprocal unilateral action 
to build confi dence and 
mask the disagreements 
that still lie between them. 
•  The question of loss 
acceptance – Can the parties 
accept necessary losses 
to make the concessions a 
settlement will require? Each 
side must understand and 
appreciate the other’s losses 
and the corrosive effects of 
past and current humiliations.
•  The question of just 
entitlements – How can 
parties collaborate to alleviate 
the worst injustices? There is 
no way to negotiate a truly just 
peace; instead opposing sides 
should work to ensure it is not 
unbearably unjust. 
To illustrate how these 
questions infl uence real-
world negotiations, Bland 
described the negotiations 
between South African 
President Frederik Willem 
de Klerk and Nelson 
Mandela, a leader of the 
African National Congress 
(ANC). De Klerk made 
numerous concessions, 
fi nally agreeing to give 
every citizen the right to 
vote and involve the ANC in 
the political process. Why? 
Bland said that every time 
Mandela spoke publicly, he 
talked about the role of the 
Afrikaners in South Africa’s 
future. By doing so, Mandela 
created a vision for the 
country that Afrikaners 
could accept. 
The goal is not to win over 
the other side. Each side 
believes that it sees the 
world as it is, an ideological 
stance Bland calls naïve 
realism. “I have never met 
anyone participating in one 
of our dialogues who said, 
‘I hope I’m changed by this. 
I hope I fi nd out how wrong 
I am and how right the 
other side is,’” said Bland. 
“Of course everyone wants 
to believe the other side is 
wrong. But somewhere in 
the process, people begin 
to realize that the views of 
the other side are indeed 
authentic.” In Northern 
Ireland, the breakthrough 
came when Republicans 
and Nationalists both said 
they understood why their 
opponents acted the way 
they did. In addition, each 
side acknowledged that 
had it been in the other’s 
shoes, it might have acted 
the same way. ••
Reverend Byron Bland, Stanford Center on International Confl ict and 
Negotiation, stressed the importance of facilitated dialogue as a strategy for 
moving beyond intractable confl ict. 
(Continued on page 7)
3  Ibid.
work. “Other S&R actors can’t 
be commanded as support 
agencies,” acknowledged LtCol 
Baird. Civil affairs personnel 
act as cultural interpreters 
for the line units, serving as 
intermediaries to facilitate 
information sharing and 
cooperation, while protecting 
NGO independence. LtCol 
Baird cited some of the issues 
impeding effective cooperation 
with other players: short fi eld 
deployments, limited resources, 
and an exclusive focus on 
accomplishing the mission. 
From a Full Metal Jacket, to 
Jarhead, A Few Good Men, 
and Rambo, civilians learn their 
stereotypes of the US military 
from the movies. There is some 
truth to these stereotypes, 
acknowledged LtCol Baird. 
“I have met some Colonel 
Jesseps, like the character in 
A Few Good Men, but that’s 
because the US military 
and especially the Marine 
Corps look for aggressive 
leaders. We don’t necessarily 
promote and reward those 
who simply collaborate and 
build teams. Our culture can 
make it diffi cult to play in the 
sandbox with others,” he said. 
Nonetheless, DoD realizes 
that it needs to implement a 
whole of government approach 
to address the world’s 
reconstruction challenges. 
As a consequence, DoD is 
committed to institutionalizing 
organizational change.
 Nongovernmental  
 Organizations 
In contrast to the US military, 
the NGO community is not well-
organized, said InterAction’s 
Linda Poteat. NGOs operate by 
building consensus on critical 
issues to coordinate response 
work, increase effectiveness, 
and agree on standards. 
As a community, NGOs are 
governed by humanitarian 
principles — neutrality, 
impartiality, and independence. 
However, the community is 
extremely diverse, with NGOs 
varying considerably in size, 
mission, geographic focus, and 
expertise. “We have NGOs 
who have been working on 
water and sanitation in Africa 
for 20 years,” said Poteat, 
“and we have others who bring 
in volunteers with a specifi c 
technical skill for just two 
weeks.” In addition, most NGOs 
are heavily localized, with the 
preponderance of staff coming 
from the geographies in which 
they work. “We have a long-
term vision for our work. Many 
NGOs stay on the ground for 
many years. As a consequence, 
our relationships are absolutely 
vital: They open doors for our 
staff and have a huge impact 
on how we operate after a 
crisis,” said Poteat.
By focusing on serving 
victims of confl icts and natural 
disasters, “we have a lot of 
job security,” said Poteat. 
NGOs will often broaden their 
reach to gain new funding, 
by responding to a natural 
disaster where they have 
a country team in place or 
focusing on emerging priorities 
for the US and international 
government, among other 
strategies. While NGOs are 
adept at raising money, they 
also have a stringent sense 
of accountability, reporting 
regularly to donors and 
members about how money 
was raised and spent. 
 Intergovernmental 
 Organizations
OCHA’s Michael Marx offered 
a primer on the UN system, 
the different agencies, and 
their areas of focus. “All have 
their own objectives and 
agendas,” Marx said. The 
UN’s humanitarian actors work 
through consensus, using 
the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee to promote global 
dialogue and make binding 
decisions for the humanitarian 
community, Marx noted. Its 
members include such groups 
as the World Food Program, 
the UN Children’s Fund, the 
UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees, and the World 
Health Organization, as well 
as major international NGO 
consortia and the Red Cross/
Red Crescent Movement. 
In the UN community, 
most decision making is 
decentralized. “If you can raise 
funds for a project, you can 
probably do it,” said Marx. 
“But it doesn’t happen quickly. 
There’s typically a lot of back 
and forth with donors.” The 
UN will usually serve as the 
middleman for these initiatives, 
funneling funding to the NGOs 
which implement about 85% of 
UN programs. 
As a civil-military advisor for 
OCHA, Marx helps coordinate 
humanitarian action with the 
full sphere of national and 
international actors, including 
UN agencies, international 
NGOs, host governments, 
donor governments, the 
Red Cross, and the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations. The donors 
have an incredible amount 
of power: setting priorities, 
funding work, and coordinating 
recipients’ activities. The work 
is personality-based, said Marx, 
and players often leverage long-
term relationships to mobilize 
support and resources.
NGOs’ humanitarian principles 
dictate their organizational 
priorities and govern worker 
behavior. As such, the UN 
and NGOs often fi nd their 
motives confl ict with those of 
the military. “The US military 
will say that they are doing 
something to win hearts 
and minds. That is not our 
perspective. We believe that the 
principles you use on the ground 
are absolutely critical, and that 
in the long-term, motives are 
sometimes as important as the 
results,” said Marx. 
Government 
Civilian Agencies 
Like the other speakers, 
Larry Sampler of S/CRS, 
cautioned against considering 
the US Government as a 
cohesive entity. “DoD and 
State are incredibly different. 
The military is command-and-
control-driven, while State 
is consensus-driven,” he 
said. These differences are 
refl ected in the organizations’ 
language. “We use acronyms 
that make our heads spin,” 
said Sampler. “We’ve got to 
create a vocabulary we can 
share. Words govern our 
actions.” S&R practitioners 
fall into a similar trap when 
they talk generically about the 
community they represent. 
“Who do we mean, when we 
say ‘we?’ I defy you to defi ne 
a coherent international 
community. We have different 
organizations and different 
priorities.” However, Sampler 
added that civilian government 
representatives need to 
avoid leading with their 
organizations’ positions which 
can impair efforts to create 
effective interagency response; 
instead they should focus on 
shared objectives. 
One of the challenges 
actors face in the fi eld is 
understanding how the concept 
of impartiality affects others’ 
actions. NGOs seek to alleviate 
suffering, knowing that relief 
could potentially be diverted to 
those individuals responsible 
for perpetrating violence. This 
ideological stance is foreign to 
military personnel. 
Participants discussed 
examples as various as 
Colombia, Palestine, North 
Korea, and Sri Lanka, where 
aiding populations in need 
may involve passing monies 
through host governments or 
rebel hands. Said a participant, 
“It is absolutely naïve to 
think that US Government 
money is not going to ‘bad 
guys.’ Congress has rules 
that money doesn’t go to 
terrorist states, but that goes 
against directives that the 
US provides money based 
on need.” In such situations, 
military and humanitarian 
objectives necessarily confl ict, 
as military forces focus on 
achieving a political objective, 
whereas NGOs seek to solve 
long-term issues and help 
local populations. “We have 
no stake in who is in charge 
as long as leaders follow 
international law,” said Poteat. 
The military’s increasing 
incursion into relief has come 
at a cost to NGOs. “How can 
villagers differentiate between 
the military and humanitarian 
groups?” asked Marx. “A 
villager may not care who is 
giving aid, but over time it does 
make a difference. There is 
guilt by association. NGOs 
have always been a target, 
but not to the extent that they 
are now. In Somalia, they are 
taking out people by name,” 
Marx added.
Tom Baltazar of USAID
spoke about his offi ce’s work 
to manage the agency’s 
day-to-day relationship 
with DoD on areas of 
common interest including 
humanitarian assistance, 
terrorism prevention, 
confl ict prevention and 
assistance, counter-
insurgency, stabilization 
and reconstruction, and 
operational activities. A 
branch of the Democracy, 
Confl ict, and Humanitarian 
Assistance Bureau, the 
Offi ce of Military Affairs 
(OMA) seeks to facilitate 
a whole of government 
response to complex crises 
by synchronizing joint 
planning activities, designing 
and holding training 
exercises and conferences, 
and managing interagency 
communications. In addition, 
OMA provides combatant 
command liaison offi cers to 
several military commands 
to strengthen the USAID-
DoD relationship and provide 
access to the right decision 
makers. OMA’s work is 
guided by Section 1207 of 
the Defense Authorization 
Act, which provides agencies 
with funding for agency 
S&R and security initiatives 
and USAID’s civil-military 
cooperation policy, which 
defi nes how government 
civilian agencies and the US 
military will collaborate and 
share information. ••
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Participants used breakout groups to plan their negotiation strategies for 
workshop simulations.
“ Forums like Working in the Same Space are 
incredibly valuable. CSRS ensures that speakers and 
participants represent a wide array of S&R actors.”  
          —  Larry Sampler, S/CRS
Introduction continued from page 6
“ The US military looks for 
aggressive leaders. We 
don’t necessarily promote 
and reward those who 
simply collaborate and 
build teams. Our culture 
can make it difﬁ cult to 
play in the sandbox 
with others.” 
     —  LtCol Bob Baird, 
US Marine Corps 
Working in the Same Space
CSRS events provide S&R actors 
with an excellent opportunity to 
strengthen their cross-community 
professional networks. 
•  Bonn International Center 
for Conversion
•  Global Majority 
•  Institute for 
State Effectiveness
•  InterAction 
•  Mercy Corps 
•  The National, 
CBC Television
•  Naval Postgraduate School
•  Pearson Peacekeeping Centre
 •  UN Offi ce for the 
Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs 
•  US Agency for 
International Development
•  US Army
•  US Department 
of Defense 
•  US Department of 
Health and Human Services
•  US Department of State
•  US Marine Corps
•  US Navy 
•  US Pacifi c Command
•  US Special Operations Command
•  University of California at Berkeley
•  York University
The Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies
The Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) 
is a teaching institute which develops and hosts educational 
programs for stabilization and reconstruction practitioners, including 
representatives from US and international nongovernmental 
organizations, intergovernmental organizations, government and 
civilian agencies, and the armed forces. Established by the Naval 
Postgraduate School in 2004 through the vision and congressional 
support of Representative Sam Farr (CA-17), CSRS creates a wide 
array of programs to foster dialogue among practitioners, as well 
as to help them develop new strategies and refi ne best practices to 
improve the effectiveness of their important global work. 
Located at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, 
CSRS also contributes to the university’s research and graduate degree 
programs. For more information about CSRS, its philosophy, and 
programs, please visit www.csrs-nps.org.
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S&R Community Stereotypes
NGOs 
•  Naive do-gooders.
•  Tree huggers.
•  Disorganized cat herders.
•  Anti-military peaceniks.
IGO 
•  Overly bureaucratic 
and ineffi cient.
• Politically indecisive.
• Life by committee.
•  Trying to take over 
the world. 
Education
•  Wonkish, absent-minded 
professors.
•  Live in an ivory tower.
•  Inept, as in the old 
adage: “Those who 




•  Ascot-wearers who can’t 
make decisions. 
•  Ineffective and totally 
unaware of it.
•  Absent or stuck in 
the embassy.
• Life by process.
Armed Forces 
•  Baby-killing warmongers.
•  Civil Affairs personnel 
who hand out toys and 
drill wells.
•  Short-timers who get in 
and get out.
•  Secretive. 
•  Good at getting things 
done; civilians just 
muddle around.
Participants introduced themselves by describing their organizations and professional roles. In addition, 
they offered up humorous stereotypes about their communities. Some of these stereotypes 
refl ect real issues, while others simply refl ect other actors’ and individuals’ 
misperceptions about organizational missions 
and work methods.
